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I argue that Heidegger’s account of technology as “enframing” is a helpful lens through 
which to understand the possible effects and dangers of transhumanism. Without 
resorting to nebulous concepts such as “dignity,” Heidegger’s analysis can help us 
understand how new technologies employed to modify the body, brain, and 
consciousness will enframe our own bodies and identities as something akin to “standing 
reserve.” Under transhumanism, the body is enframed as an external, technologically 
modifiable product. I indicate some of the problems that might arise when our own 
bodies no longer appear as central to our identity as embodied beings. Further, I argue 
that, by treating aspects of our own consciousness as technologically modifiable, we will 
be driven into a commodified and inauthentic relation to our identities. By examining the 
work of prominent transhumanists – including Brad Allenby, Daniel Sarewitz, and Andy 
Clark – I show how the threat that technology poses can be hidden when the essence of 
technology is not uncovered in a primordial way. I argue that by threatening to obscure 
death as a foundational possibility for Dasein, transhumanism poses the danger of hiding 
the need to develop a free and authentic relation to technology, Truth, and ultimately to 
Dasein itself. 
 
In this paper, I argue that Heidegger’s account of enframing (Gestell) is a helpful lens through 
which to understand the possible effects and dangers of unbridled transhumanism with respect to 
innovations in Human Genetic Enhancement (HGE), cloning, and human cybernetic 
implementation of nanotechnology to enhance cognitive and biological functions. Without 
resorting to nebulous concepts such as “dignity,” Heidegger’s analysis can help us understand 
how biotech will enframe our own bodies as something akin to “standing reserve.”1 The body 
thus becomes an object present-at-hand that is open to our manipulation. Heidegger’s analysis of 
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technology also allows us to speculate about some specific problems that might arise with regard 
to the modified frame in which our bodies will appear to us. 
 
In this paper, I draw attention to one of these possible problems. Death and decay may begin to 
appear as events that occur to an enframed body; the body, figured by transhumanism as an 
external object open to mechanical alteration, will be what suffers decay and faces death, and 
thus these are not possibilities that the self must face. Transhumanists often make one of two 
claims: Either the body we inhabit now will be able to live for hundreds of years or our 
consciousness will be “downloadable” into multiple bodies. Either of these positions (in subtly, 
but importantly, different ways) alienates human experience from central aspects of the finitude of 
embodiment, and the proposed outcomes would radically alter our existence. Mark Coeckelbergh 
offers an excellent analysis of this aspect of transhumanism: 
 
Transhumanists have articulated visions that seem to aim at invulnerability and 
immortality. Consider the writings of two well-known proponents of human 
enhancement: Nick Bostrom and Ray Kurzweil. Bostrom has written a tale about a 
dragon that terrorizes a kingdom and people who submit to the dragon rather than 
fighting it. According to Bostrom, the “moral” of the story is that we should fight the 
dragon, that is, extend the (healthy) human life span and not accept aging as a fact of life 
[Coeckelbergh cites Bostrom 2005b, 277]. And in The Singularity is Near (2006) 
Kurzweil has suggested that following the acceleration of information technology, we 
will become cyborgs, upload ourselves, have nanobots in our bloodstream, and enjoy 
nonbiological experience. Although not all transhumanist authors explicitly state it, these 
ideas seem to aim toward invulnerability and immortality: by means of human 
enhancement technologies, we can transcend our present limited existence and become 
strong, invulnerable cyborgs or immortal minds living in an eternal, virtual world. (2011, 
1) 
 
Aubrey de Grey, of course, is also famous for advocating such alterations to our temporal being 
(see de Grey 2008). In light of the importance of being-toward-death, I will argue that this would, 
viewed from a Heideggerian perspective, be a momentous change. Specifically, in Being and 
Time (and elsewhere), Heidegger locates being-toward-death as central to the call to authenticity, 
and away from lostness in the they-self (for whom technological enframing holds sway); by 
threatening our awareness of our own mortality, transhumanism thus threatens to occlude the call 
to authenticity, just as it occludes the need for it. 
 
Further, in the hypothetical future depicted by transhumanist thinkers we might lose what I will 
call the “fleshiness of experience.” When we begin to see ourselves as technological products of 
our own rational calculative control and creation, we face a very real danger of being consumers 
of identity (to an even deeper extent than is already the case), and we stand to lose the orientation 
by which we discover the need to wrestle with our finite nature. This struggle plays an important 
role in human behavior, and the technologies advocated by transhumanists hold the promise of 
radically altering our relation to both our embodiment and our mortality. 
 
Humans become what we are by struggling with a natural, physical world that does not 
immediately respond to our desires. The world resists us, and demands that we flow with it, and 
deal honestly with the organic. When we enframe the organic, transforming it into more 
mechanical technology to be readily manipulated, we lose that orientation. When our own bodies 
become enframed through a technology that defies even death, what will become, for example, of 
the desire for transcendence that has been one of the most historically powerful forces leading to 
the creation of art, philosophy, and drives the need for making interpersonal connections? What 
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happens when the development of identity is enframed within an economy of commodification in 
which we buy alterations of our identity? 
 
By way of preface: I do not think anything I write is likely to have any effect on the evolution of 
technology or its incorporation into our culture, our lives, and our bodies. I am largely in 
agreement with Brad Allenby, co-author of The Techno-Human Condition, on this point. In a 
“conversation” on Slate.com, he states: 
 
Nick is worried that I am assuming that it’s already “too late.” Well, yes and no. I think 
when that ape picked up the bone, and reconceptualized it as a weapon, and developed a 
culture in which bones and stones were used as weapons, it was in a meaningful sense 
already “too late,” if you wanted to avoid human technological enhancement… I’m just 
trying to understand what’s out there, and what it says to me is that a) rapid and 
accelerating technological evolution across the entire technological frontier is here, and 
it’s already created psychological, social, and cultural changes we haven’t begun to 
understand; b) because these systems are powerful, and grant personal and cultural 
authority, and have significant military and security implications, they are going to be 
hard to modify or stop; and c) even if we could modify them, they are sufficiently 
complex so at this point, with our existing institutions and worldviews, we are clueless as 
to whether we are doing something ethical and rational, or not. Tough world. But I’m not 
saying that it’s good or bad. Just that it’s already here… (Allenby 2011) 
 
This paper, then, while clearly a call for exercising what I take to be reasonable caution in 
altering our bodies, is not primarily intended to work against the inevitable progress of 
technology in the direction of HGE or cybernetics. Further, I want to make it clear that I am 
aware of the very real practical benefits of such technologies, including prolonging the human 
healthspan and eradicating debilitating diseases. I intend this paper merely to serve as another 
entreaty that we might collectively begin to attend to the possible effects of these enormous 
changes. I am certainly not qualified to comment on the technological feasibility of any of these 
technological advances; further, while much has been written about the terrifying likely social 
and political effects of advanced technologies, I will focus on a few possible phenomenological 
consequences from a Heideggerian perspective. 
 
Part I – Heidegger, enframing, and biotechnology 
 
There is no way in the space available to give a full interpretation of Heidegger’s work on 
technology. Heidegger speaks of technology in far too many places for this paper to lay any claim 
to being comprehensive – from his discussion of tools in Being and Time, to his essay on art, his 
account of mathematics and science in What is a Thing?, his work on architecture in Building, 
Dwelling, Thinking, and most obviously, the essay I will be focusing on here, The Question 
Concerning Technology. In lieu of any such adequate interpretation, I will boldly make some 
general claims about Heidegger’s questioning concerning technology and then consider what 
insights his work has to offer a world facing such seemingly radically different forms of 
technology, such as HGE and nanotechnology – radically different, that is, from anything in 
Heidegger’s own time. After this too-brief look at the technology essay, I will return to Being and 
Time to argue that in his early work Heidegger was already concerned with the dangers of 
enframing and standing reserve (though not in those terms), and I will seek to articulate the 





Heidegger’s central concern is stated clearly in the opening paragraph of The Question 
Concerning Technology. He advises us that this essay is a questioning concerning technology. He 
is not setting out to tell us “what technology is,” nor to close the issue for posterity. His goal is 
plainly stated as opening “a way.” He advises us to pay heed to the way as opposed to fixating 
“on isolated sentences and topics”: 
 
We shall be questioning concerning technology. And in so doing, we would like to 
prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it opens our human 
existence to the essence of technology. When we can respond to this essence we shall be 
able to experience the technological within its own bounds. (Heidegger 1977, 287) 
 
The way he marks out for us begins with calling attention to our relation to technology. Our 
question, then, is: In light of this way, what are the dangers to a free relation to technology posed 
by bio- and nanotechnology, and HGE? 
 
It is crucial to understand that, for Heidegger, technology is not something we make or do. It is 
not primarily a set of instruments; it is not a “means” or a “human activity.” Such a 
characterization would make technology seem to be “external” to us, to our lives – technology 
would be just a bunch of things that we use, and the techniques that some worker uses to produce 
them. It is tempting to think of technology as “other,” as some activity “going on” out there 
somewhere, or as a bunch of things that one uses or not, based on free choice. Treating 
technology in this way – as “instrumental” –  is a misunderstanding of it, according to Heidegger. 
Understanding that “technology is nothing technological,” will help us understand that, despite 
radical advances in technology, its essence remains the same. 
 
There has been a huge amount of work done on Heidegger’s critique of technology. He has been, 
perhaps correctly, deemed a “technophobe,” and even called a “philosophical redneck” by 
Richard Rorty (1988). However, it is too seldom emphasized that Heidegger’s concern is not 
simply with technological objects, but with ontology. Iain Thomson puts it well: “… Heidegger’s 
critique of technology is not primarily concerned with particular technological devices, but rather 
with ontological technologization, that is, with the disturbing and increasingly global 
phenomenon… by which entities are transformed into intrinsically meaningless resources 
standing by for optimization…” (2005, 45). It is thus a mistake to limit our ethical response to the 
dangers of technology to encouraging its “responsible use” (though such responsibility is, of 
course, necessary). If Heidegger is right, the phenomenological changes effected by technological 
developments cannot be addressed at the level of autonomous subjects choosing either to use or 
not use them. 
 
Rather than being an “external” activity or collection of products or techniques of production, 
technology is “internal,” so to speak; that is, technology is essential to the way “the real,” the 
world, appears to us. Whether the state-of-the-art is a seemingly “external” hydroelectric plant, or 
a tiny chip inside our brain that alters the way we see, technology is internal to each of our lives 
and our worlds, and hence to our identities (Heidegger would not speak in terms of “internal” and 
“external,” but using such imprecise terms will help us understand how use of technology to alter 
our bodies is significant). Thus, it is essential to understand how technology is a “global” 
phenomenon that alters Dasein’s entire world: “Technology is therefore no mere means. 
Technology is a way of revealing” (Heidegger 1977, 294). In order to understand how our reality 
is revealed “through” technology, we must briefly address a few salient aspects of the much-
discussed concepts of enframing and standing reserve. 
 




Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., 
challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. 
Enframing means that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern 
technology and which is itself nothing technological. (Heidegger 1977, 302) 
 
Technology as enframing is the mode in which everything comes into the open, and makes sense 
for us. In ordinary German, Gestell means frame, framework, or skeleton. Technology, as Gestell, 
“frames” the beings we encounter in the world, and thus becomes the “backbone” of the 
appearing world.  
 
As I will highlight below, when we turn to “standing-reserve,” under the holding-sway of 
enframing beings make sense only in terms of an ordered system of items, present-at-hand, that 
exist for our manipulation and control. The forest is there for us as lumber, the river is there for 
us as electric power. What, then, of our own bodies, and even our consciousness? I will argue that 
enframing naturally tends toward obliterating every boundary, and will fundamentally alter the 
way we understand our selves. Attending to Heidegger’s “way,” our goal is to regain a free 
relationship to technology, such that we can illuminate its proper bounds.  
 
Why is understanding technology as enframing central to understanding how Dasein gathers the 
world into intelligibility? Dasein creates a world for itself; however, it is important to hear this 
“creation” not as the “activity” of a subject. Dasein falls into a world that is open, cleared, and 
in which beings come into their intelligibility. This is what it means to say that Dasein is 
essentially “in the truth.” Dasein, in its very being, opens the world for view; this opening in the 
being of Dasein is not to be understood as anything a subject “does” actively. 
 
In fact, this very misunderstanding – i.e. thinking of Dasein as an active subject that “makes” or 
“fabricates” its world – is precisely a symptom of technological speech/thinking; it would be as if 
this creation of a world “by Dasein” were an act of techne on the part of a subject. This language 
of production is specifically the problem – when we treat the world, the earth as something for us 
to use, manipulate, produce, we see we are lost in the discourse of the they-self – we are not yet 
called to ourselves and to the nature of truth and of Dasein.
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 This is especially important for us on 
the verge of technological manipulation of our own bodies. When Dasein (mis)understands itself 
to be active “as a subject” in creating not only its world, but also its own body through external 
technological manipulation, when self-production becomes buying a new cybernetic addition, or 
even a buying a new body, then the enframing of everything as standing-reserve holds sway.  
 
Whether “good” or “bad,” this shift in which the body becomes an external object, present-at-
hand for our technological manipulation, will certainly be momentous. We have reason to worry 
about it, and I am quite sure Heidegger’s analysis of technology, if it was ever right, still has 




Another dimension of the danger of enframing can be seen in the way technology occludes its 
own danger, and the contingency of the mode in which it reveals the world. Heidegger warns: 
“Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing” (1977, 309; 
emphasis added). Thus, not only will our bodies be enframed, but any other mode, any more 
authentic relation to our own embodiment, will become unthinkable. This danger is heightened, 
within the Heideggerian framework, when we attend to the way this particular technological 




Where is there attested for us a demand that we, in our essence, resist the holding sway of 
everything revealed as standing reserve? That possibility – the call which allows us the possibility 
of breaking free of technology and the they-self – comes precisely from an awareness of our 
mortality. In threatening the anxiety of being-toward-death, transhumanism threatens any 
possibility that we might free ourselves from the enframing of technological thinking, and thus 
covers over the only possibility for letting ourselves and the world appear as it is, in its essence 
(wesen) and phusis. 
 
Heidegger closes the essay on technology by quoting from Holderlin; the poet says: “But where 
the danger is, grows / the saving power also”. . . and “poetically dwells man upon this earth” 
(1977, 316). There is hope, but only by a turning away from technology, from enframing.
4
 How 
can we turn away from that of which we are completely unaware? If the nature of finite Dasein, 
as possibility, as the “There,” as “in the truth” (and thus simultaneously revealing and concealing 
beings) is concealed, from where will the call to authenticity come? Where the enframing of 
technology holds sway, all other modes of revealing – including the poetic – are concealed. 
Authentic awareness of our own finitude and mortality can call us away from this holding-sway; 
however, again, advances in biotech, cybernetics, and the possibility of “downloading” (or 
“uploading”) our consciousness into multiple bodies pose the threat of occluding even this saving 
power.  
 
I am reminded of the second chorus of Sophocles’ Antigone. In this “Ode to Man,” Sophocles 
shows that humans are the naturally “homeless” animals, and we are defined by the need to 
harness the powers of animals and nature to build a place for ourselves. Hence, with “speech and 
wind-swift thought” we alter the world around us to fit our needs. Despite “man’s” great power, 
“Only against death has he at last no refuge.” What happens when, just as we once harnessed the 
power of animals to plow our fields, we begin to yoke our own nature to the whims of our desires, 
and find control even over death? 
 
The concern I am trying to raise in this paper is that when even our own selves, facts about our 
cognitive orientation, our emotions (notably empathy), etc., are technologically manipulated, our 
deepest selves will give way to enframing; we will order ourselves and take an inauthentic 
relation to our identity. My concern is that when this enframing holds sway over the self, any 
possibility of what Heidegger calls a “free” relation to technology will be concealed. We are on 
the verge of forgetting, as a society, the proper bounds of technology. There is little we can do; 
these bounds cannot contain “progress.” But perhaps we can echo the call of our finitude into the 
future.  
  
We can  now turn to Heidegger’s concept of “standing reserve” to become more clear about why 
technology poses this threat. How are the world, the real, and ultimately our own selves revealed 
as standing reserve? 
 
Heidegger shows that enframing reveals the world in a dangerous and problematic way – a 
situation that will be exacerbated by the advances in question. “The revealing that rules in modern 
technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it 
supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such.” Under technology, everything appears 
as a “resource” to be exploited. We become blinded to the nature of the world around us. Beings 
only come into the light, into the clearing, insofar as they answer to our perceived “needs.” 
Everything is expected to answer, in its very being, to our desires.  
 
In order to bring this mode of revealing to light, Heidegger famously uses the example of the river 
Rhine as it appears against the horizon posed by the hydroelectric plant that converts the flow of 
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the river into electricity. Heidegger places this mode of revealing in contrast to the poetic 
(poiesis); while poiesis is a “bringing forth,” enframing is a “challenging.” While the windmill’s 
sails turn in the wind, seemingly “just as” the turbines in the plant turn in the flow of the Rhine, 
Heidegger claims that since the windmill does not “unlock energy from the air currents in order to 
store it,” there is a fundamental difference (1977, 296). The wind is allowed to flow on its own – 
we might add that the birds are allowed to continue in their flight. However, the hydroelectric 
plant changes the flow of the river – and the paths of the fish in it. Another example is mining vs. 
(traditional) farming: “… a tract of land is challenged in the hauling out of coal and ore. The earth 
now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit” (ibid.). In traditional 
methods of farming (as distinct from modern mechanized agriculture), the “peasant does not 
challenge the soil…” (ibid.). In each case, it is essential to remember that the issue is one of 
revealing; the land the peasant farmer cared for, and put in order, “appears different” under the 
cultivation of mechanistic agriculture, just as the Rhine appears in a different light passing under 
the old stone bridge than it does when obstructed by the power plant. 
 
Following the work of Otto Spengler, Heidegger notes that technology has this global effect on 
how the world is revealed to us. In Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life, 
Spengler writes: 
 
… all things organic are dying in the grip of the vice of organization. An artificial world 
is permeating and poisoning the natural. The civilization itself has become a machine that 
does, or tries to do, everything in a mechanical fashion. We think only in horsepower 
now; we cannot look at a waterfall without mentally turning it into electrical power; we 
cannot survey a countryside full of pasturing cattle without thinking of its exploitation as 
a source of meat-supply; we cannot look at the beautiful old handwork of an unspoilt 
primitive people without wishing to replace it by a modern technical process. Our 
technical thinking must have its actualization, sensible or senseless. The luxury of the 
machine is the consequence of a necessity of thought. In last analysis, the machine is a 
symbol, like its secret ideal, perpetual motion – a spiritual and intellectual, but no vital 
necessity. (1932, 94) 
  
In order to understand the importance of this transformation of our understanding of the world, 
and the effect that the enframing of the human body (and consciousness) will have on human self-
understanding, i.e. on how we are revealed to ourselves, we will look briefly at the work of some 
prominent transhumanists. By looking at the claims from these thinkers themselves, we will be in 
a better position to understand the depths to which technological thinking will, and indeed 
already has, occluded itself as a contingent, and dangerous, mode of revealing. That is, by 
looking at the way these new technologies are being championed by the people who are 
dominating public discourse on the subject, we will be able to bring to light the extent to which 
Heidegger’s thoughts on technology are, in fact, incredibly timely. We will find a deep lack of 
awareness of the subtle dangers inherent in enframing – the revealing of nature, and our own 
selves, as standing reserve. 
 
II. A lot of worry over “nothing new”? 
 
Brad Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz, in their book The Techno-Human Condition, and Andy Clark, 
in Natural-born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence, argue 
persuasively that we have, in Clark’s phrase, “always been cyborgs.” Allenby and Sarewitz argue 
that technology is not something “new” that is present only in power plants or coal mines but 
absent in windmills or farming; for them, the human condition is, and always has been, what they 
call “The Techno-Human Condition.” We are all already “enhanced,” and “some would say 
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transhuman” (Allenby and Sarewitz 2011, 2). They argue that some have made the distinction 
between “inner” and “outer” transformation of the body – e.g. the difference between wearing 
eyeglasses to enhance vision, and some sort of HGE or “artificial body parts” that ensure perfect 
vision. But, they ask: “is anything new really going on?” They, of course, answer in the negative.  
 
For Allenby and Sarewitz, the technological modification of the body is simply “fulfilling our 
biology.” The fact that we “never forget how to ride a bicycle, or how to read, shows that 
allegedly external technologies do in fact have an enhancing effect on our internal capabilities” 
(2011, 15). There would thus be no substantial difference between writing down facts we want to 
remember, or using Google to “enhance” our memory, or having a microchip implanted in the 
brain which has access to data that we can consciously and immediately control. “The history of 
our species is a history of redesigning ourselves, of fuzzing the boundaries between our inner and 
outer worlds” (2011, 16). So, they argue, it “isn’t clear to” them that HGE is “crossing some 
domain that humans have never entered before, a domain that demands a new kind of debate or 
raises new moral considerations and dilemmas” (2011, 17). We will see that Heidegger might 
agree, to some limited extent, with this assessment: While enframing is certainly not “fulfilling 
our biology,” it is true that the troubling alteration of human thought began long before HGE 
became a foreseeable possibility. 
 
Drawing on what has come to be called the “extended mind hypothesis,” Andy Clark argues that 
as soon as humans began writing we began incorporating technologies into our consciousness 
(2004, 6). For Clark, this process is nothing new, and nothing to be feared. This is not to say, 
however, that he does not recognize how emerging technologies will increase exponentially the 
ways that human beings will become cyborgs: 
 
New waves of user-sensitive technologies will bring the age-old process of cyborgization 
to a climax, as our minds and identities become ever more deeply enmeshed in a non-
biological matrix of machines, tools, props, codes, and semi-intelligent daily objects. We 
humans have always been adept at dovetailing our minds and skills to the shape of our 
current tools and aids. But when those tools and aids start dovetailing back – when our 
technologies actively, automatically, and continually tailor themselves to us just as we do 
to them – then the line between tool and user becomes flimsy indeed. (2004, 7) 
 
While this observation about the blurring of the line between humans and technological products 
could easily have been written by someone who would preach caution at such a merging with 
machines, Clark is a vocal optimist about the momentous transition that he describes. 
 
Clark is correct to suggest that this change, marked by a situation in which the technological 
extensions of our powers begin to “dovetail back,” is fundamentally important, and requires 
attention. There is a subtle phenomenological difference between the situation of a blind person 
with a cane (as described, for example, by Merleau-Ponty) and a situation in which the 
enhancement is performed by a technological product, designed by other people and purchased by 
the “user.” In both situations there is a dimension in which there is a “flimsy” line between the 
hand and the tool; however, this facility is developed by the blind person through interaction and 
practice. All people develop organic relations with the world – relations that are more noticeable 
in people with disabilities – in which cane, pen, paper, eyeglasses, etc., are phenomenologically 
extensions of the hand, the mind, and the eye. These organic relations, however, are 
fundamentally different from a cybernetic attachment through which our relation to the world is 
designed, marketed, and then purchased according to the whim and will of the designers and the 




In his book, Clark addresses several worries about these changes that he has encountered in being 
a vocal proponent of transhumanism. In particular, he discusses the concern that technology 
might come to “control” us: “Many feel, for example, that increased human-machine symbiosis 
directly implies increasing control. In an age of ubiquitous computing must we be slaves to the 
whims of the machines that surround us?” (2004, 175). Here, Clark addresses what he takes to be 
the concern that if we become merged with machines, the machines might “control” us; he is, 
however, operating on what I take to be an extremely mundane and even naïve conception of 
“control”; he does not seem to give any credence to the more subtle negative forms of influence 
that merging consciousness with technology might have. Thus, he responds: “… the kind of 
control we, both as individuals and as society, look likely to retain is precisely the kind we always 
had: no more no less… The fear of ‘loss of control,’ as we cede more and more to a web of 
technological innovations is simply misplaced” (2004, 175). Perhaps he is right to say that the 
kind of control we have over technology – and the control it has over us – is no different in kind 
from the influence modern technology has over us; but if Heidegger is correct, the extension of 
that control to our biology and to the direct alteration of our consciousness and our genetic code 
is reason enough for serious caution and reflection. In the Parmenides, Heidegger writes: 
 
Perhaps the much discussed question of whether technology makes man its slave or 
whether man will be able to be the master of technology is already a superficial question, 
because no one remembers to ask what kind of man is alone capable of carrying out the 
“mastery” of technology. (1998, 86) 
 
In any case, we see that Heidegger would, in a certain limited sense, agree with Allenby, Sarewitz, 
and Clark that there is “nothing new” in these emerging technologies (in contrast to the 
suggestions of Don Ihde, for example).
5
 Nano and biotech simply extend the reach of these 
technologies, without fundamentally altering the issue – that is, the essence of technology as 
enframing. As we have seen, however, the true danger of enframing lies in treating our 
technological relation to the world as our basic, definitive, and indeed only way of being: “Where 
this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing” (Heidegger 1977, 309; 
emphasis added). Accordingly, this specific extension of the reach of enframing to our bodies and 
even our consciousness is momentous in that it extends enframing to our own embodied identity 
while simultaneously altering our relation to our own finitude and mortality.  
 
Allenby argues that we are fulfilling our biology, our nature – and that we have always been 
cyborgs. Heidegger would clearly disagree, and argue that there is a specific historical origin and 
tradition through which this contingent mode of enframing has risen to prominence; he would 
never accept that enframing is “fulfilling our biology.”  
 
However, insofar as they agree that there is “nothing new” in emerging technologies – and even if 
we had “always done this” – it is falling deeper into the danger of enframing to think that this is 
the only way to reveal the self. The work of these transhumanists helps us see the concrete reality 
of the danger; that is, transhumanists such as Allenby and Clarke seem incapable of thinking of 
any other way human beings might relate to themselves. They explicitly claim that there is no 
conflict or tension between our nature and technology, since our nature has always been 
cybernetic. Even if they are correct that eyeglasses make someone a cyborg as much as 
genetically altering our eyes or replacing our eyes with machines, and thus there is “nothing new 
here,” Heidegger warns that every “aspect” of ourselves that is subjected to enframing brings 
with it the familiar dangers of enframing as standing reserve. For Allenby and Clark this “nothing 
new” is not problematic because it is an extension of technology, and technology appears 
unproblematic to them. To someone attuned to the essential dangers of technology, “nothing 
new” is not sufficient cause for complacency, but rather the extension of an established concern 
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to new dimensions of life that might previously have served as valuable sites of resistance. 
Further, the inability of Allenby and Clark to see the contingency of this danger indicates the 
heights to which the danger has grown, obscuring any other mode of revealing. 
 
Perhaps it is true that there is no substantial difference between getting liposuction, or taking a 
pill that causes weight loss, or reprogramming the nanobots in our blood to store fat or burn fat at 
a different rate; but, I argue, each of these is fundamentally different from an authentic relation to 
our own bodies and to our selves. These are “external” manipulations of the self, and thus 
fundamentally different from the self-relation that arises from developing self-discipline in the 
face of a world and a body that do not immediately behave the way we might want them to. 
Maybe there is nothing new in nanotech, as opposed to taking pills to solve what is wrong with us, 
but it is surely an extension of something about which people like Heidegger were already deeply 
concerned one hundred years ago – an extension of the process of enframing to new dimensions 
of ourselves. 
  
III. Dasein and death 
 
What will become of us when we no longer fear death? I argued above that, from a Heideggerian 
perspective, our understanding of our own bodies will be radically changed by technological 
modifications; our bodies will seem to be “external” objects answerable to our “needs” and 
desires. While this can have obvious benefits, about which the transhumanists have hypothesized 
widely, I argue that by turning the body into an external object, enframed as standing reserve, we 
fall into the danger of misunderstanding the essentially embodied nature of existence. Here, I will 
argue that the danger is extended to deeper aspects of our self-understanding when death becomes 
an event that occurs not to Dasein, not to the self, but merely to the body, with which we will no 
longer identify.  
 
While it is true that Heidegger himself says nothing in The Question Concerning Technology 
about death calling us to a free relationship to technology, I believe that his earlier insights into 
how anxiety calls us from the they-self can be fruitfully applied. When a comparison is made 
between the ideas about technology and nature in Being and Time and those in the technology 
essay, we can begin to see the depth of the danger we face. 
 
I am aware that, given Heidegger’s “turn,” it is dangerous to bring together the work of the much-
later technology essay with the analysis of death in the early Being and Time. However, while 
caution is warranted, death continues to be a central theme for Heidegger’s work after the kehre, 
and I argue that Heidegger never abandoned the centrality of being-toward-death for the analysis 
of Dasein as the “There” in which beings are disclosed. Insofar as the essence of technology is a 
mode of disclosing, death and technology must be thought together, even if Heidegger does not 
explicitly make this connection in the essay. Sallis has an excellent analysis of this situation in 
Echoes:  
 
… the words death and mortal never cease to reappear. Not that the later discourses on 
death replace, revise, or even reopen the analysis of death completed in Being and Time. 
On the contrary, all the later discourses serve constantly to confirm the earlier analysis by 
reinscribing it within contexts that otherwise decisively exceed that of Being and Time. 
(1990, 135)  
 
Sallis then looks at this confirmation in the later Heidegger with reference to the Beitrage zur 
Philosophie (1936-1938), “The Thing” (1950), The Principle of the Ground, (1955-1956), and 
The Essence of Language (1957-1958). While death is not explicitly an issue in The Question 
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Concerning Technology, it was written in 1954, when being-toward-death was still explicitly a 
concern of Heidegger’s; as Sallis argues, the analysis of the centrality of death to Dasein remains 
unchanged since the composition of Being and Time. 
 
In his famous discussion of the hammer in Being and Time, Heidegger is calling our attention to 
worldly beings in order to make clear the “worldly character of the world”; he accomplishes this 
by looking at the “everydayness” of Dasein, who is always engaged with things. For the most part, 
these beings appear to us as handy, as “ready-to-hand.” In that light, the being of beings appears 
as for us – everyday things appear as being for our use. It is important to note that this appearing 
is not simply limited to any particular object, but is indicative of a larger sphere of activity; i.e. 
the hammer is not simply a hammer, but it appears as handy within the project of building some 
structure for some human purpose. Beings come to light in their being in virtue of a larger sphere 
of concern – just as we saw above in the case of technology. Again, here we are concerned with 
the effects of the apparently unlimited character of technological holding-sway over the mode of 
appearance of beings – specifically, our own bodies.  
 
In the context of that discussion, Heidegger makes a reference to the appearance of “nature” that 
is remarkably similar to his later work on technology. He explains how “materials” (and tools) 
are obscured in the process of work, in favor of the goals of this work. In that connection, he 
explains how “nature” comes to light not in its own wesen, but rather in virtue of how it can be 
manipulated and put to work for our purposes. “Nature” comes to light in the work as “steel, iron, 
metal, stone, wood”: 
 
But nature must not be understood here as what is merely objectively present, nor as the 
power of nature. The forest is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock, the river 
is water power, the wind is wind “in the sails.” As the surrounding world is discovered, 
“nature” thus discovered is encountered along with it. We can abstract from nature’s kind 
of being as handiness; we can discover and define it in its pure, objective presence. But in 
this kind of discovery of nature, nature as what “stirs and strives,” what overcomes us, 
entrances us as landscape, remains hidden. The botanist’s plants are not the flowers of the 
hedgerow, the river’s “source” ascertained by the geographer is not the “source in the 
ground.” (Heidegger 1996, 66, H70): 
 
Here, we see not only that technology and work provide the horizon against which beings come 
into presence, but also that scientific observation of nature, by treating objects, including the 
human body, in their mere “objective presence,” cannot stand as part of the “saving power.” But 
if this is Dasein in its everydayness, how can we be called from lostness in the world of handy 
technological projects, in which the “nature” of beings appears ready-made as standing reserve 
and commodities for our concernful use? 
 
For Heidegger the answer lies in anxiety: That mood in which we understand our finitude, and are 
called to an authentic relation to our mortal nature. For the most part, Dasein evades encountering 
death. When such an encounter appears, it is dismissed as something that happens “to someone 
else,” or as an “event” that will happen “sometime in the distant future.” Dasein thus hides from 
itself its ownmost truth as “being-toward-death.” An authentic being-toward-death reveals to 
Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and calls us from our everydayness into an uncanny awareness 
of our own nature. For our purposes here, it is important to see how this authentic relation to 
death has the possibility of challenging enframing by calling us to realize the essence of Dasein 
(as the clearing); thus, we can see how these new technologies, in threatening to further hide from 




How does awareness of death call us from the they-self, and thus from the idle talk that treats 
beings as standing reserve? It accomplishes this by calling Dasein to an awareness of its own 
uncanny nature. Being and Time is oriented, from the beginning, toward the attempt to get Dasein 
into view in its wholeness. The movement to Part II of the text marks this shift, and problematizes 
the issue of drawing this being which is always “ahead of itself” into view as a whole. How do we 
get such a being to come into view as a whole? In order to accomplish this, Heidegger must 
articulate how death as our “ownmost possibility” calls into the light our nature as possibility. 
“Possibility” is not to be confused with factual “possibilities” for Dasein – e.g. it is “possible” in 
this vulgar sense for me to get a different job, eat better, join the army, be a coward, etc. Rather, 
“possibility” must be understood as an existential, and as equiprimordial with understanding; that 
is, possibility is always a mode in which beings come into the clearing in their being: “We must 
remember that understanding does not primarily mean staring at a meaning, but understanding 
oneself in the potentiality-of-being that reveals itself in the project” (Heidegger 1996, 243, H263). 
 
We can develop a free relationship to technology only when we see that it is itself “nothing 
technological”; that is, the free relationship to technology is possible only when we realize that 
the essence of technology is a gathering of beings in which beings are cleared, and understood, 
by virtue of a particular mode of the being that is Dasein. In Being and Time (and, I will argue, 
for the later Heidegger as well) being-toward-death is that through which we come to realize our 
nature as Dasein, and thus put ourselves in a position where it becomes possible to understand the 
essence of technology. 
 
Anticipatory resoluteness – the mode in which Dasein is fully aware of its mortality – reveals to 
Dasein both its lostness in the they-self and their idle talk, and its own nature as possibility:  
 
Being-toward-death is the anticipation of a potentiality-of-being of that being whose kind 
of being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-of-being, 
Dasein discloses itself to itself with regard to its most extreme possibility. But to project 
oneself upon one’s ownmost potentiality of being means to be able to understand oneself 
in the being of the being thus revealed: to exist. Anticipation shows itself as the 
possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and extreme potentiality-of-being, that is, as 
the possibility of authentic existence. (1996, 242, H262) 
 
Authentic existence appears as a possibility only when we understand ourselves as the being 
defined by possibility. As anticipatory, we are always ahead of ourselves – just as enframing is 
“ahead of us” in revealing beings as standing reserve. Until we understand this ontological 
structure of possibility, and its equiprimordial connection with language, understanding, concern, 
thrownness, etc., we cannot understand the essence of technology. In speaking of death here, 
Heidegger directs our attention back to Section 31, “Dasein as Understanding,” to help make 
clear the place of being-toward-death in revealing to Dasein the way its nature as possibility 
gathers the world into intelligibility, and allows beings to come to light (including the possible 
mode of enframing).  
 
In order to produce a free relation to its own nature, and thus, possibly to the essence of 
technology, Dasein must “become what it is”: “Because of the kind of being which is constituted 
by the existential of projecting, Dasein is constantly ‘more’ than it actually is…” (Heidegger 
1996, 136, H145). This aspect of self-understanding is central to understanding the being of the 
“there,” and thus the way beings are cleared in their being, including enframing: 
 
[Dasein] is existentially that which it is not yet in its potentiality of being. And only 
because the being of the there gets its constitution through understanding and its 
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character of project, only because it is what it becomes or does not become, can it say 
understandingly to itself: “become what you are!” (Ibid.) 
 
We fundamentally are what we become; what we understand ourselves as being in the mode of 
possibility – that is, what we see as possible modes of being – is circumscribed by our projects 
and our understanding. In the world in which technology holds sway, our projects and the mode 
in which we understand beings in their being has been taken over by enframing. That is: 
Technology’s true power lies in delimiting how we understand ourselves. “Project always 
concerns the complete disclosedness of being-in-the-world. As a potentiality of being, 
understanding itself has possibilities which are prefigured by the scope of what can be essentially 
disclosed to it” (Heidegger 1996, 137, H146). Thus, technology, by delimiting our projecting 
understanding of our own nature, prefigures its own appearance. It is thus not at all to be 
wondered at that transhumanists do not see technology as a threat to authenticity; it is written into 
the very nature of enframing as a totalizing disclosing of beings (as standing reserve) that it 
occlude its own essence as such. 
 
Lostness in the they-self and idle talk, which speak always within the horizon of technological 
disclosure, covers over the truth of Dasein as possibility, and also hides the truth of our ownmost 
possibility from us; thus, by presenting the world as nothing to be anxious about, enframing and 
the concerns of the they hide the ground of the possibility for a free relation to technology. 
Transhumanists claim that nano and biotech, HGE, etc., will be able either to extend the life of 
this body indefinitely through mechanical manipulation of it as an object present-at-hand, or to 
re-frame death as an event that occurs to a body with which I will no longer be identified (since 
my consciousness can be downloaded). In subtly different ways, both of these approaches fall 
directly into the enframed conception of nature and the body characteristic of the they; both 
approaches threaten to disguise our ownmost possibility, and thus disguise our nature as 
possibility. In this world, enframing will hold total sway over my conception of my body and my 
identity.  
  
IV. “Null ground of a nullity,” religion and humanity 2.0 
 
Technological alterations of the body are, of course, not the only mode in which a person can 
hide their ownmost possibility from themselves. Heidegger tells us that the fact that most people 
live as if they are unaware of the significance of their mortality is no argument against the 
fundamental nature of this “fact”; rather, Dasein “fleeing from [being-toward-death], initially and 
for the most part covers over its ownmost being-toward-death” (Heidegger 1996, 233, H251). 
This is the result of existing primarily in the mode of “falling prey,” and the condition of being 
“always already absorbed in the ‘world’ taken care of” – a world that is increasingly revealed by 
technology (ibid.). 
 
Traditionally, of course, the primary form in which people flee from this resolution (in addition to 
remaining immersed in worldly tasks and idle talk) has been religion. If God is there, and each of 
us has a purpose, there is no reason to face this ownmost possibility – death is just an event, 
however, momentous, that marks our journey into a greater set of possibilities. 
 
But what of a technological world in which belief in God seems almost quaint? Ray Kurzweil 
reveals how the transhumanist relates himself to this situation by proclaiming that we will create 
God through technology! For the transhumanists, we will make ourselves gods; we create 
ourselves in our own image, from our own imagination. There is a sense in which the 
transhumanist becomes the causa sui – the one who erases and transcends her humanity, her 
mortality, her physicality, and creates herself.
6
 In so doing, the creator grants meaning, the 
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ultimate “existentialist” act of self-creation in the face of the void. There is no God, we will 
create God, we will create ourselves, etc. In the face of Dasein, revealed in anxiety as the “null 
ground of a nullity,” the transhumanists want to design and erect a present ground, and become 
their own creator. 
 
What does this mean for our purposes? Heidegger characterizes Dasein, in its “thrownness,” as a 
“null ground of a nullity”: “as care, Dasein is the thrown (that is null) ground of its death” (1996, 
263, H285). Our thrownness is finding ourselves always already caught up in a world with pre-
established talk, stories, a horizon, a set of symbols into which we are thrown, and through which 
we are to understand ourselves, other people, our proper roles – what it means to be a man, what 
is a “good woman,” a good American, etc. Today, more and more, we are thrown into a world 
guided by the essence of technology. This thrown, “null” ground is the “other side” of our 
finitude, so to speak: We come into an always-already-established world, with the body we 
happen to be born “into,” in a specific time and socio-economic position, and a concomitantly 
limited set of possibilities. 
 
Can the transhumanist escape the mortal nature of Dasein by “designing” the self, both body and 
consciousness? Can transhumanists escape the need for Dasein to recognize itself as the “null 
ground of a nullity” by technologically modifying the body and consciousness, and by willfully 
projecting the ground for their own existence? A transhumanist might claim that in erasing, or 
radically mitigating, the fear of death, we erase the inauthentic reasons for conforming to 
communities – without the fear of death, there is no reason to fall into the they-self in the first 
place, since there is no anxiety to escape! Thus, far from being the highest form of the total 
domination of the enframed they-self, the world the transhumanist promises will free us from this 
all-too-human situation altogether. As Kurzweil and de Grey, for example, argue, there is no 
reason to attach ourselves so strongly to the identity of a group to accomplish symbolic 
immortality – for the self can achieve real immortality! 
 
Is this the case? In becoming the causa sui, will the very situation that causes anxiety and 
inauthenticity fall away in this utopia? I argue no. As much as Kurzweil might want to become 
immortal, he cannot become infinite (even though we hear him talking this way in moments that 
seem even more inspired by science fiction than usual). He cannot go back and raise himself, 
cannot go back and erase the struggles of puberty in his specific culture. Even if he changes 
bodies, becomes female or adopts some biologically-designed genderless or multi-gendered body, 
he still will have been raised a man in a specific time, with a specific set of roles, expectations, 
anxieties, etc.  
 
The transhumanist might counter that in a thousand years – when gender and race are no more, 
when bodies are exchanged and mean as little as clothing, or the color of hair – we will achieve 
total freedom from finitude. Will we? No. Rather, it will mean, for the children of this dystopian 
future, a thrownness into a false image of freedom. The freedom to choose which body to inhabit, 
etc., might seem like a perfection of “freedom”; however, this “choice” is as false a sense of 
freedom as the freedom of a consumer to buy their identity at Hot Topic rather than the Gap. We 
must remember that very few people will actually be engaged in the process of designing these 
new technologies. The vast majority of people will simply be consumers of body and identity 
modifications. This is not the venue to perform a Marxist analysis of such a transhumanist 
situation, but it is easy to see how quickly corporations would take control of the market in the 
interests of profit rather than human freedom. Real freedom can only come with Truth, and 




What will become of the authentic call to action, the meaning and purpose that we create and feel, 
when we give ourselves over to the “real” as enframed by technology? That meaning will be 
taken over, fully, by technology. Technological enframing – life as standing reserve – will reign 
supreme. Instead of coming of age in a world in which we face the unrelenting resistance of the 
organic, in which we live in the fear and terror and anxiety of the flesh, we will seek to create our 
own ground. The transhumanist seeks to be the causa sui, to avoid anticipatory resoluteness (and 
the authenticity that comes only from facing this truth) by becoming the ground of their own 
existence. But this existence, and the terms in which they understand “freedom” already come to 
them enframed by technology. In seeking freedom from mortality by becoming cyborgs – through 
technologizing the biological, the self, and the soul (and, ultimately, the other, and our relation to 
them, as well!) –  we become free of death by enslaving ourselves to the technological enframing 
of the world as standing reserve. Enframing becomes the mode through which the roles that we 
are expected to play in order to develop self-esteem appear to us.  
 
Further, this supposed “freedom” from inauthentic conformity to the they-self, driven by aversion 
to the anxiety rising from an awareness of our mortality and finitude, will not lead to genuine 
diversity. Rather, “freedom” from death through technological modification of the body will lead 
to radical conformity, and toward homogenization. Rather than the erasure of the fear of death 
leading us away from clinging to the death-denying illusions of the they-self, this already-
enframed concept of authenticity and “individuality” (as commodity to be traded) will throw us 
into radical conformity. For Heidegger, death “individualizes” Dasein. Death is our “ownmost” 
possibility; that is, transhumanism will cover over what is most our own. It will obscure that 
which makes us aware of ourselves as radically individualized: In facing death, “Dasein stands 
before itself, all relations to other Dasein are suspended.”7 It is death that pulls us from the they-
self, and thus anticipatory resoluteness is the condition for the possibility of conceiving of oneself 
as an authentic, free individual; there is nothing that technology can do to alter this situation. 
Without authenticity, technology can allow us only more exciting and appealing chains. 
 
One might reasonably object that, while this might be true of facing death, there are certainly 
many other experiences that will still be open to the undying (or, incredibly long-lived) post-
human that will allow her to understand her own nature as Dasein, as possibility, and to become 
an authentic individual. Why give anticipatory resoluteness, facing our own death in a recognition 
of being-toward-death, such privilege? John Sallis explains:  
 
Why the privilege? Why is Being-toward-death the most originary among those forms of 
disclosedness structured by projection? What can originary and origin (ursprunglich, 
Ursprung) mean here? One direction is clearly marked: because death is the possibility 
that suspends all others, thus suspending also Dasein’s relations with others in the 
everyday world, disclosure from this possibility serves to draw Dasein back before itself 
alone, to recall it from a dispersion in the world back to a certain unity with itself. A 
certain wholeness. (Sallis 1990, 129) 
 
For Heidegger (as well as for other existentialists such as Kierkegaard, Beauvoir, and Sartre, not 
to mention the existential psychologists they inspired, including Ernest Becker, Erich Fromm, 
Otto Rank, etc.), true individuality does not come from anything “external.” True individuality 
and authenticity arise only in some form of anticipatory resoluteness. It is in coming to grips with 
our mortality that we become who we are as individuals, and develop a sense of independence 
and self-possession against the darker image of our nature (as meaningless, momentary 
aberrations) presented by our anality and physicality. I argue that in the world predicted by 
transhumanists we might lose the fleshiness of experience. When we begin to see ourselves as 
technological products of our own rational calculative control and creation, we lose the 
59 
 
orientation by which we discover the need to wrestle with our dual nature: we are both “spirit” 
and transcendence, and also a finite, eating, defecating, and decaying body. 
 
It is this struggle that has always, according to these thinkers in the existentialist tradition, defined 
human endeavors. In a transhumanist future, the struggle will continue to define us, but it will 
always already be enframed by HGE and nanotech – it will appear against the horizon of the 
holding sway of technological enframing. We have always become what we are by struggling 
with a natural, physical world that does not immediately respond to our desires, but which strikes 
against us, resists us, and demands that we flow with it and deal honestly with the organic. 
Heidegger warns that the Rhine, enframed by the power plant, “appears to be something at our 
command” (1977, 297). When we, through transhumanism, (attempt to) turn the organic into 
more mechanical technology, we lose that orientation – not just the world, but the self, our very 
identity, is given over to enframing. When our own bodies become enframed through a 
technology that defies even death, we are not freed for genuine individuality. Living in the truth 
of our finite, thrown, null, “guilty” (in Heidegger’s sense) nature is essential for authenticity; this 
nature is covered over, not eradicated or fundamentally changed. We cannot escape finitude or 
embodiment – but its nature can be obscured. In this concealment, we lose the ground upon which, 
in wrestling with our dual nature, we strive to become authentic individuals. 
 
The world will come to reveal itself just as modern science represents it (under the originary 
influence of technology): “as a calculable coherence of forces” (Heidegger 1977, 303). We can 
already see the effects of this on empirical psychology. Hence, Don Ihde says: 
 
… it then appears that the human response to the world seen as enframed is the activity of 
calculatively ordering the disposition of resources. Thus, just as nature appears, within 
enframing, as standing-reserve, so the human task appears as a kind of command of 
nature through technological means. (2010, 38) 
 
In this situation, all mystery will fade from the world, as everything will seemingly lend itself 
immediately to the calculation and control of scientific technology. 
 
Technology provides a semblance of mastery over objects, even over death: 
 
… where beings are not very familiar to man and scarcely and only roughly known by 
science, the openness of beings as a whole can prevail more essentially than it can where 
the familiar and well known has become boundless, and nothing is any longer able to 
withstand the business of knowing, since technical mastery over things bears itself 
without limit. (Heidegger 1977, 131) 
 
In untruth, we conceal that we are concealing truth, and conceal that we are distorting beings in 
their being. Untruth becomes obscured as well. This distortion (and with it the subsequent 
concealing of the distorting concealment) comes when we hold to what is readily available, when 
we hold to the frameworks in which things make sense (e.g. technology). From within these 
frameworks, the “mystery” that Heidegger claims is necessary for Truth appears only as 
momentary lapses, as obstacles soon to be overcome, since the framework itself is never in 
question, and expands itself to reveal all beings as standing reserve and answerable to our 
conceptions (cf. Heidegger 1977, 128-137). 
 
To be human is to respond – in Alphonso Lingus’ terms – to “an Imperative” (1998). The world 
makes demands on us: the demand for objectivity, truth, etc., is precisely a response to a hugely 
diverse, non-reducible set of imperatives offered by every situation, every culture, every 
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individual, every piece of wood for the carpenter, or this piece of stone for the sculptor – that is 
the irreducible nature of the world, and more, of our own selves. To face nature is to face an 
otherness that resists our conceptions as well as our will. As indicated in the Second Chorus of 
the Antigone, we encounter the otherness in dealing with animals and in the wind and the stone 
and the ocean, and even in our own bodies in illness – but all these elements can now be 
overpowered. Only over death have we no such power; only in anticipation of death do we realize 
the absolute resistance of the world to our enframing. This resistance – again, the fleshiness of 
experience – is covered over in the technological conquest of death, and of the body. When even 
the flesh is enframed as standing reserve, everything will seem to dance to our tune. In this danger 
lies the danger of the absolute forgetting of nature, experience, and the self. 
 
The seemingly limitless power of self-manipulation that will be frame and horizon for 
consciousness will occlude this truth, and with it, the truth of the world. As Heidegger says in 
Being and Time, nature as what “stirs and Strives,” as what “overcomes us,” is not apparent in 
enframing. The uncanny alterity of nature is obscured along with the “nothingness” at the heart of 
our being that is revealed in facing mortality. Everything appears as familiar, as controllable and 
answerable to our desires. We will overstep our bounds not because there is some “God” with a 
plan, or some trans-historical human “essence” to be violated, etc. – we will overstep our bounds 




1. My concerns here are also fundamentally different from the practical concerns about HGE 
expressed by thinkers such as Fukuyama, who writes: 
 
There are good prudential reasons to defer to the natural order of things and not to think 
that human beings can easily improve on it through causal intervention. This has proven 
true with regard to the environment: ecosystems are interconnected wholes whose 
complexity we frequently don’t understand, building a dam or introducing a plant 
monoculture into an area disrupts unseen relationships and destroys the system’s balance 
in totally unanticipated ways. So too with human nature. . . (2003, 97–98)  
 
Cf. Parens 1995. 
 
2. Cf. On The Origin of the Work of Art for a discussion of this danger to the Earth. 
 
3. Obviously, then, I am disagreeing with Don Ihde’s claim that Heidegger’s analysis of 
technology is outdated. In Heidegger’s Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives, Ihde 
argues that Heidegger’s “mythologized” and “romantic” understanding of technology is not able 
to deal with emerging technologies, specifically, in the fields of genetics, nanotechnology, and 
communications. He criticizes Heidegger for treating all forms of modern technology, from “the 
mechanized food industry” to “the death camps” and the “hydrogen bomb” as “in essence” the 
same (Ihde 2010, 114). “To attend to the ‘essence’ of technology, I argue, blinds Heidegger to the 
differing contexts and multidimensionalities of technologies that  pragmatic-phenomenological 
account can better bring forth” (2010, 115). 
 
While it is true that Heidegger’s concern operates at a level in which the specificities of the 
effects of different forms of technology are not attended to, his concern is not intended to work at 
that level. Heidegger is interested in revealing the essence of technology, as Ihde recognizes; if 
this level of analysis “blinds” the reader, that is their own failing. If, on the other hand, a reader 
wants to show that forms of technology that have emerged after Heidegger’s own time have 
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revealed that Heidegger was wrong about the essence of technology, or that no such essence 
exists, the burden of proof is on the reader. Ihde has attempted this, but has, in my opinion, failed. 
I will not be engaging his analyses directly here, but I argue in the text that Heidegger’s analysis 
of the essence of technology has much to teach us about the momentous nature of the changes to 
human life that HGE and cybernetics will effect. 
 
4. The “saving power” and poetic thought are central to understanding Heidegger’s struggle with 
technology; I will, unfortunately, not be addressing those issues in this relatively short paper. 
 
5. Feenberg accuses Heidegger of ahistoricism for looking for a seemingly ahistorical account of 
the essence of technology (1999). I entirely agree with Iain Thomson’s replies to each of 
Feenberg’s criticisms (Thomson 2005, 58–77). 
 
6. Hannah Arendt writes, in the Prologue to The Human Condition:  
 
This future man, whom the scientists tell us they will produce in no more than a hundred 
years, seems to be possessed by a rebellion against human existence as it has been given, 
a free gift from nowhere (secularly speaking), which he wishes to exchange, as it were, 
for something he has made himself. … The question is only whether we wish to use our 
new scientific and technical knowledge in this direction, and this question cannot be 
decided by scientific means; it is a political question of the first order and therefore can 
hardly be left to the decision of professional scientists or professional politicians. (1958, 
3) 
 
7. Campbell notes a distinct political dimension to Heidegger’s insistence that individuation is 
threatened by technology in his analysis of “proper” and “improper” writing in Heidegger’s work 
– specifically, “proper” writing as with the hand, and “improper” as mediated by the 
technological apparatus of the typewriter: “The idolatrous nature of improper writing is that it 
awards a power to the collective capable of persuading men and women that they more properly 
belong to a collective” (2011, 6). Campbell goes on to show the deep connections between 
Heidegger’s criticisms of technology and his attack on Leninism, in which both cause “the 
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